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Abstract
We present three simple and efficient protocol constructions to solve Yao’s Millionaire Prob-
lem when the parties involved are non-colluding and semi-honest. The first construction uses
a partially homomorphic Encryption Scheme and is a 4-round scheme using 2 encryptions, 2
homomorphic circuit evaluations (subtraction and XOR) and a single decryption. The second
construction uses an untrusted third party and achieves a communication overhead linear in
input bit-size with the help of an order preserving function.Moreover, the second construction
does not require an apriori input bound and can work on inputs of different bit-sizes. The third
construction does not use a third party and, even though, it has a quadratic communication
overhead, it is a fairly simple construction.
Keywords: Secure two-party computation, Cryptography, Security
1 Introduction
Alice (owning a private variable x) and Bob (owning a private variable y) wish to determine the
truth value of the predicate “x > y” without disclosing any of their private data except for what
is implied by the result. This article details the attempts to solve this problem efficiently by
using techniques different from the ones already presented. This problem is famously known as the
Millionaire Problem in the literature. The solution to the millionaire problem finds applications
in e-commerce and data mining; and also forms a sub-procedure in solving the vector dominance
problem [6].
The remainder of the article discusses the related research in this area (Section 2) and presents
three new constructions – termed ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ (Section 3). Each protocol starts with definitions,
terminologies and constructions used, followed by the protocol, its complexity and a brief security
analysis. Any other added details in a protocols are included thereafter. Finally, in Section 4, we
conclude and mention some directions that can be taken to further this research.
∗Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Jodhpur, India. Email:
ashishkumar@iitj.ac.in
†Center of Excellence – ICT, Indian Institute of Technology Jodhpur, India. Email: ag@iitj.ac.in
1
2 Background and Related Work
Yao [18] gave the first protocol for solving the secure comparison problem. However, the solution
was exponential in time and space requirements. In 1987, Goldreich et al. [11] proposed a solution
using scrambled circuits to any secure multiparty computation problem.
Beaver et al. [2] presented a constant-round solution for multi-party computation. Chaum et al.
[5], Beaver and Goldwasser [1], and Goldwasser and Levin [12] have studied fairness in two-party
computations with extension to multiparty computation. Feige et al. [7] study the multi-party se-
cure computation models in the presence of an untrusted third party which does not learn anything
about the inputs. Cachin [4] also presented an elegant and practical solution to the millionaire
problem using an untrusted third party T based on the Φ-hiding assumption.
Schoenmakers and Tuyls [16] used threshold homomorphic encryption schemes to solve the mul-
tiparty computation problem. Lin and Tzeng [14] proposed a two-round protocol for solving the
millionaire problem in the setting of semi-honest parties using multiplicative or additive homo-
morphic encryption schemes. Fischlin [8] constructed a two-round protocol for the millionaire
problem using the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme (The computation cost of the protocol is
O(λ n) modular multiplications, where λ is the security parameter and the communication cost is
O(λ n logN), where N is the modulus). Blake and Kolesnikov [3] presented a two-round protocol
for the problem using the additive homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem. Its computation cost is
O(n logN) and the communication cost is O(n logN). A Symmetric cryptographic solution to the
millionaires problem and evaluation of secure multiparty computations was presented by Shundong
et al. [17]. In 2003, Ioannidis and Grama [13] proposed an efficient protocol for the problem, hav-
ing a suboptimal time and communication complexity. In 2009, Gentry [9] proposed the first fully
homomorphic encryption scheme which allows one to compute arbitrary functions over encrypted
data.
3 Construction of the Protocols
We work out three protocol constructions that are efficient and simple.
3.1 Protocol A Construction
Assumption: We assume the existence of an efficient partially homomorphic encryption. By
partial, we mean that the homomorphic encryption should have the properties of additivity and
bit-wise XOR.
Alice owns a private value a and Bob owns the private value b. Here we represent a and b in two’s
compliment form such that the sign of any integer (represented as a binary string) is stored as the
most significant bit of its corresponding binary string. Also, all XOR operations performed are
bitwise.
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1. Bob owns a Homomorphic public key encryption scheme (E,D).
2. Bob now computes E(b) and sends it to Alice.
3. Alice generates a random number R and computes:
(a) E(a),
(b) then V = (E(a)− E(b)) ⊕ E(R)
and sends V to Bob. Note that V = E((a − b) ⊕ R) by the properties of homomorphic
encryption.
4. Bob decrypts V to obtain (a−b)⊕R and sends the most significant bit (MSB) of the decrypted
value to Alice – it contains the information about the sign of the operation (a− b).
5. Alice then takes the XOR of the obtained bit from Bob and the MSB of R to obtain the
output: if a > b.
3.1.1 Analysis
The security analysis of Protocol A is trivial and is based on the security of the corresponding
homomorphic encryption scheme and the fact that one time pads are secure for a single use of a
key.
Communication Overhead: Let the input with larger number of bits be a. Then the communi-
cation overhead can be seen to be: 2|E(a)| + 2.
Computation: The protocol is efficient. The computation overhead is: 2(Complexity of encrypting
a variable) + (Complexity of subtraction in the homomorphic scheme) + (Complexity of XOR in
the homomorphic scheme) + (Complexity of XOR of 2 bits (step 5 of the protocol)). The first term
depends on the encryption scheme used; the second and third term depend on the homomorphic
scheme used and the last term is a constant.
3.2 Protocol B Construction
As we will formalize the protocol, we will also note that even if a single party, out of the two
involved parties, is computationally powerful, the protocol will be able to exploit the computation
power of that party to perform the computationally expensive tasks in the protocol.
We begin with the following definition.
Definition 3.1. (Order Preserving Function:) A function F : A → B (where |A| ≪ |B|) is
called an order preserving function if a < b ⇐⇒ F (a) < F (b), ∀a, b ∈ A.
For example, f(x) = 2x is, clearly, an order preserving function.
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3.2.1 General Idea of Protocol B
Suppose Alice and Bob have some random order preserving function F : A → B, unknown to a
third party. Later we’ll see how to construct such an order preserving function.
Now if Alice and Bob send X = F (a) and Y = F (b) to Ursula (the third party), then a > b iff
X > Y – follows from the definition of order preserving function.
3.2.2 Construction of a Random Order Preserving Function, F
Let the input size be n bits, i.e., n = max(⌈log a⌉, ⌈log b⌉). As we will present the construction,
we will note that that construction need not know the input sizes in advance and neither does it
require the inputs to have the same bit-sizes.
Then to construct F , we consider n random functions: f1, f2, . . . fn, where each fi : {0, 1} → N is
used to encode the ith least significant input bit.
Let us assume that the mappings follow the following constraints:
(fi(1) − fi(0)) >
i−1∑
j=1
(fj(1) − fj(0)), (1)
fi(1) > fi(0) ∀i. (2)
We can always find such values for f1, f2, f3 . . . fn satisfying the above constraints. For a sample
construction of F , refer to Section 3.2.3
Let ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denote the ith least significant bit in the binary representation of an input a.
Then define
F (a) := fn(an) + fn−1(an−1) + . . .+ f2(a2) + f1(a1), (3)
where, F : {0, 1}n → N.
Theorem 3.1. F is an order preserving function.
Proof. Let x0, y0 ∈ N. Assume, without the loss of generality, x0 > y0. Let x, y correspond to the
binary representation of x0, y0 respectively. Here x, y ∈ {0, 1}n. We show that F (x) > F (y), where
F is constructed as above. We denote the ith bit (starting from the least significant bit numbered
1) of a bit string x by xi. Since x > y, x must have a 1 at the first bit position at which x and
y differ, starting from the most significant bit. Let this position be p. By the construction of the
function F , we have:
(fp(1)− fp(0)) >
p−1∑
j=1
(fj(1) − fj(0)). (4)
4
Now,
F (x) = fn(xn) + fn−1(xn−1) + . . .+ f1(x1);
and
F (y) = fn(yn) + fn−1(yn−1) + . . .+ f1(y1).
So,
F (x)− F (y) = fp(1)− fp(0) +
p−1∑
j=1
(fj(xj)− fj(yj)),
Since, all bits at positions higher than p are equal for x and y and hence, their mappings being
equal, cancel out.
Thus for F (x) > F (y), we require
fp(1) − fp(0) +
p−1∑
j=1
(fj(xj)− fj(yj)) > 0 (5)
⇒ fp(1) − fp(0) >
p−1∑
j=1
(fj(yj)− fj(xj)). (6)
To show that inequality (6) holds, we show that it holds for the maximum value of the RHS. RHS
is maximum when we have xk = 0, ∀ k < p and yk = 1, ∀ k < p (this is because if we have
xk = yk = 0 or xk = yk = 1, then fk(yk)−fk(xk) = 0, and since fk(1) > fk(0) ∀ k, by construction;
hence for xk = 0, yk = 1, we have fk(yk)− fk(xk) > 0, i.e. it has a positive contribution to the sum
on the R.H.S). So, we require that:
fp(1)− fp(0) >
p−1∑
j=1
(fj(1)− fj(0)),
which we know is true by the construction of F (see equation (4)).
The proof for x < y =⇒ F (x) < F (y) is analogous. This completes the proof.
3.2.3 An Example Construction of F
Let us consider an order preserving function F : {0, 1}4 → N.
An order preserving function F can be thought as a sequence of functions mapping each bit position,
i.e.,
F = {f1, f2, f3, f4}
where fi represents the mapping corresponding to the ith bit starting from the least significant bit
(which is the first bit.)
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fi fi(0) fi(1) fi(1) − fi(0)
i∑
j=1
fj(1)− fj(0)
f1 3 5 2 2
f2 7 10 3 5
f3 1 8 7 12
f4 4 18 14 26
Table 1: Computation of fi
Input (x) F (x)
0000 15
0001 17
0010 18
0011 20
0100 22
0101 24
0110 25
0111 27
1000 29
1001 31
1010 32
1011 34
1100 36
1101 38
1110 39
1111 41
Table 2: Computing F
While constructing the functions fi, we need to take care of the following constraints:
fi(1) − fi(0) >
i−1∑
j=1
(fj(1)− fj(0)),
fi(1) > fi(0) ∀i.
The computation of fis is tabulated in Table 1
Table 2 tabulates the image of all 4 bit numbers using the defined mapping F .
NOTE:While constructing the function F , we can independently choose fi(0) for every i and then
we can accordingly choose fi(1) to satisfy the constraints mentioned.
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3.2.4 Constructing Shared Function
Consider an order preserving function F . We will show one possible construction of F and argue
its correctness thereafter. Here, F (x) = F (xn . . . x1) is defined as:
F (xn . . . x1) = fn(xn) + fn−1(xn−1) + . . . + f2(x2) + f1(x1),
where the values of fi(0) and fi(1) are:
fi(0) = s ∀i
fi(1) = s+ k
il ∀i
where s, k(> 1) and l are randomly chosen constants, whose choice is critical to the protocol
3.2.5.
Proposition 3.2. F is an Order Preserving function.
Proof. By theorem 3.1, we only need to show that
fi(1) − fi(0) >
i−1∑
j=1
(fj(1)− fj(0))
or,
fi(1) >
i−1∑
j=1
(fj(1)− fj(0)) + fi(0). (7)
We first show how the encryption handles inputs of different bit sizes, provided that they do not
contain any leading zeros (i.e. 00101 should only be represented as 101). Without loss of genrality,
we can assume that |a| > |b|. Then the most significant bit of a (which is 1) has position i(> j),
where j is the most significant bit-position of b. For the construction to work, we require:
F (a) > F (b)
or
i∑
x=1
fx(ax) >
j∑
x=1
fx(ax)
We show this by plugging the maximum value of RHS and comparing it with the minimum value
of LHS (i.e. we take a = 10 . . . 0 and b = 11 . . . 1):
fi(1) +
i−1∑
x=1
fx(0) >
j∑
x=1
fx(1)
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si+ kil >
j∑
x=1
(s + kxl) = sj +
(kj+1 − k)l
k − 1
Which we can easily see by combining the following two inequalities:
si > sj, Since i>j
And,
kil ≥ kj+1l, As i>j
=⇒ kil > (kj+1l − kl) >
(kj+1 − k)l
k − 1
Since k>1.
We now prove the same for equal bit sizes (where we assume that both the inputs − a and b differ
at bit-position i, when we start scaning from the MSB and since we have assumed that a > b, a has
a 1 at position i and b has a 0 at position i) and show that inequality (7) holds for the maximum
value of the RHS (i.e. all bit-positions of a less significant than ith are 0 and all bit-positions of b
less significant than ith are 1 ). So, plugging in the values in inequality (7), we require
fi(1) >
i−1∑
j=1
(s+ kj l − s) + s,
fi(1) > s+
(ki − k)l
k − 1
(8)
But,
fi(1) = s+ k
il > s+
(ki − k)l
k − 1
, (In our construction)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that k > 1.
Thus the required inequality (8) is satisfied by our construction.
Since the above argument is true for all i, we have shown that F is an Order Preserving function.
Note: Our construction works well even if the bit-size of the inputs are unequal and
not known apriori. We also do not require any bound on input for the function since
the function is defined for bit positions upto ∞.
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3.2.5 Formalizing Protocol B
1. Alice generates l, s, k − the parameters for construction of F , and communicates it to Bob.
2. Alice then flips an unbiased coin and obtains: bit u ∈ {0, 1}, and sends it to Bob.
3. If u = 1, they use their inputs as is, otherwise, if u = 0, they take the bit-wise complement of
their inputs and use the complemented inputs in the protocol instead of the original inputs,
thus reversing the order of their inputs.
4. Alice and Bob now construct the function F using the common parameters: s, l, k, u and
generate F (a) = A and F (b) = B; where a is the binary representation of Alice’s private
input and b is the binary reprensation of Bob’s private input (or the bitwise complements of
their inputs, depending on the value of u); and send it to Ursula.
5. Ursula compares A and B and tells the result to Alice and Bob, where Alice and Bob obtain
the protocol outcome depending on the value of the unbiased bit u. If u = 0, they reverse
the result obtained by Ursula to get the correct outcome; else they take the outcome to be
what Ursula tells them.
The correctness of the protocol follows from previous discussions.
Note: Here, as wee can see that all the computationally expensive tasks are being
done by Alice, thus, in real time applications, when using the protocol with one of the
two parties being a resourceful server, we can assign the role of Alice to that server
and use its computation power to perform all the computationally expensive tasks,
making the protocol even more computationally efficient and practical.
3.2.6 Analysis
Note that
max{F (x)} =
n∑
j=1
s+ kil = ns+
(kn+1 − k)l
k − 1
,
for x ∈ {0, 1}n.
Thus, maximum number of bits in F (x) = log(ns + (k
n+1−k)l
k−1 ) = O(nlogk + logl + logs + logn).
Thus size of F (x) is linear in n and requires O(n) bits to communicate it to the untrusted third
party (where k, l, s are randomly chosen constants).
Communication Overhead: The protocol requires communicating: s, l, k, u to Bob (by Alice)
(O(logs + logl + logk + 1) bits); F (x) and F (y) (both O(n) bit long) to Ursula; and sending the
result back to Alice and Bob, using a single bit for each. Hence, the overall overhead is linear in n.
Computational Overhead: F (x) is O(n) time computable. Thus the overall computational
overhead is O(n) + (computational overhead of generating an unbiased bit).
Security:
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1. The third party doesn’t know the value of s, l or k, and the only value that Ursula obtains is
F (a) and F (b). Here, F (a) is of the form:
F (a) =
∑
j∈U
s+
∑
j∈V
(s+ kj l) = ns+
∑
j∈V
kj l;
where U = {i : ai = 0} and V = {i : ai = 1}.
Thus, the securty of individually guessing F (a) or F (b) depends on the security of n, which
is unknown since protocol does not require input number of bits apriori and neither does it
require them to be equal; and also depends on the hardness of factoring, as the algorithm
would require the factoring of the second summand to obtain k, l; which are chosen to be
large to make the protocol secure. Even before that, Ursula would need to guess ns from
F (a), for which there are exponential number of possibilities (because F (a) is O(n) bits and
thus its value can be 0 to 2n bits long) and hence is exponentially hard to guess. Another
information that Ursula can obtain is F (a)− F (b):
F (a)− F (b) =
∑
j∈Va
kj l −
∑
j∈Vb
kj l = constant× l;
The security of F (a)− F (b) is dependant on the difficulty of factoring of the R.H.S value to
obtain l, which would be difficult to guess if l, k (which determines the constant) are large
composite numbers making it difficult to factor R.H.S at first place and on top of that, guess
which factor of the value equals l.
2. Since the values sent to the third party may be order preserved or order reversed with equal
probability, the probability distribution is also evenly distributed for lower as well as higher
values. The third party also cannot gain information about the minimum or maximum value
of Alice’s or Bob’s private input (which could possibly have been given away by F (x)), since
the event that {x > F (x)} and the event {x < F (x)} are equally likely in general and in our
protocol as well (since the bit u is unbiased).
3. Since F (x) and F (y) have atleast as many elements between them as x and y (F is an order
preserving function), this gives away information regarding the maximum gap between x and
y (via the difference between F (x) and F (y)). Although this data is not statistically useful in
many scenarios, we can still patch it with an added communication overhead as shown later
in the extension to this construction in Section 3.3.
3.3 Extension of Protocol B
The construction of F in section 3.2.4 can be modified to make k an O(n)-bit long value so that
the gap between the mapping of the numbers under F which differ only in their least significant
bit (this gap corresponds to the minimum achievable gap between two input numbers) has a gap
of atleast 2n and hence gives away no relevant statistical data about the input ( Since for n-bit
numbers, knowing that there are 2n elements between them does not enable us to narrow down on
any value or a range of values).This resolves the issue mentioned earlier in Section 3.2.6.
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Clearly, the maximum number of bits to be transmitted in this case is:
O(log(max{F (x)})) = O(log(
n∑
j=1
s+ kil)) = O(ns+
(kn+1 − k)l
k − 1
) = O(nlogn),
for k, l, s = O(n).
Thus, this new protocol has a linearithmic communication overhead. Its computation overhead is
same as before.
3.4 Protocol C Construction
Definition 3.2. Order Preserving Function at a point b: A function F : A → B is called
an order preserving function at point b if for every x ∈ A, x < b =⇒ F (x) < F (b) and x > b =⇒
F (x) > F (b).
Here we present one possible construction of an Order Preserving Function at a point b.
The function F generates the output of its input a bit-wise, with each input bit ai (where ai
represents the ith bit starting from the least significant bit numbered 1, in the binary representation
of the input a) being mapped to its output by a random function: fi : {0, 1} −→ N.
Definition 3.3. We define a set S = {i : bi = 0}, (bi denotes the ith least significant bit in the
binary representation of the value b). Then, we define a (rise)i to be [fi(1)− fi(0)], ∀i ∈ S.
Note: (rise) refers only to the elements in S.
Definition 3.4. Similarly, we define a set Y = {i : bi = 1}, (bi denotes the ith least significant bit
in the binary representation of the value b). Then, we define a (fall)i to be [fi(1)−fi(0)], ∀i ∈ Y .
Note: (fall) refers only to the elements in Y .
3.4.1 Construction of F
1. We randomly map fi(bi) to an element in N, where bi corresponds to the ith least significant
bit in the binary representation of the input b.
2. Now, ∀i ∈ Y , we randomly select a mapping for fi(0) in (fi(1)− vi − l, fi(1)− vi), where l is
a parameter randomly chosen by the constructor of the function, and
vi =
∑
∀j∈S s.t. j<i
(rise)j.
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3. Similarly, ∀i ∈ S, we randomly select a mapping for fi(1) in (fi(0)+ui, fi(0)+ui + l); (where
l is the parameter chosen in step 2), and
ui =
∑
∀j∈Y s.t. j<i
(fall)j.
4. We have our construction ready.
F (x) = F (xn . . . x1) = fn(xn) + fn−1(xn−1) + · · ·+ f1(x1).
3.4.2 Proof of Correctness
Here we only prove that for all x ∈ N, x < b =⇒ F (x) < F (b), where F is an order preserving
function at b. The proof for “x > b⇒ F (x) > F (b)” is analogous.
If x < b, then at the first bit (starting from MSB) at which x and b differ, x must have a 0 and b
must have a 1. Let this position be t (w.r.t. the position of the LSB, which is 1). Clearly t ∈ Y ,
where Y is defined in definition 3.4
The critical case or the worst case, proving which will prove all other cases, is the one where all
bits of x which are at positions less significant than t equal 1, i.e. xi = 1 ∀i < t. Also, the
bit-positions more significant than position t are the same in both x and b, since t is chosen to be
the first bit-position at which x and b differ.Thus,the only positions at which x differs from b are
the positions less significant than tth bit at which bits of b are 0 and bits of x are 1 and all such
positions correspond to a “rise”, forming a subset of S [S is defined in definition 3.3](since other
bits in x and b which are less significant than tth bit are both 1 and hence identical).
By construction, we have
(fall)t = ft(1)− ft(0)
=⇒ (fall)t > ft(1)− (ft(1)− vt) = vt, plugging in the maximum value of ft(0) from constraint 2
=⇒ (fall)t >
∑
∀j∈S,j<t
(rise)j, By deinition of vi. [refer 2].
=⇒ ft(1)− ft(0) >
∑
∀j∈S,j<t
(fj(1)− fj(0)), By definition of (rise)j [refer 3.3]
=⇒ ft(1) +
∑
∀j∈S,j<t
fj(0) > ft(0) +
∑
∀j∈S,j<t
fj(1), By rearranging the terms
Let G = {i : i > t or (i < t and i ∈ Y )}. These are precisey the positions not covered in the above
inequality. Since all these bit-positions are identical in the binary representation of both x and b,
i.e. G also equals the set: {i : bi = xi}, thus
∑
j∈G
fj(bj) =
∑
j∈G
fj(j)
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Adding the above equality to the previous inequality, we get
ft(1) +
∑
∀j∈S,j<t
fj(0) +
∑
j∈G
fj(bj) > ft(0) +
∑
∀j∈Ss.t.j<t
fj(1) +
∑
j∈G
fj(xj)
=⇒
∑
∀j
fj(bj) >
∑
∀j
fj(xj),
=⇒ F (b) > F (x),
Thus, our proof is complete.
3.4.3 Sample Construction
Let the input bound on bit size be 4. Let the function F be constructed w.r.t. 1001 as per the
construction procedure in Sec 3.4.1 . We have the following table
fi fi(0) fi(1) (rise)i (fall)i
f0 13 25 - 12
f1 36 54 18 -
f2 30 43 13 -
f3 -32 1 - 33
The values in boldface represent the values which have been chosen uniformly at random (since
they correspond to the bits of 1001).
We thus have the following table for the function F .
x F (x)
0000 47
0001 59
0010 65
0011 77
0100 60
0101 72
0110 78
0111 90
1000 80
1001 92
1010 98
1011 110
1100 93
1101 105
1110 111
1111 123
Clearly, the function F preserves order at point b = 1001 (in boldface).
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3.4.4 Worst case analysis of |F(x)|
Let b = bdbd−1 . . . b2b1. Let fi(bi), ∀i be randomly chosen in the range [n,m]. For the worst
case analysis, we choose the maximum value for fi(0) ∀i ∈ S and minimum value for fi(1) ∀i ∈ Y
from the ranges specified in the construction 3.4.1. Let |b| = d. We have the following table which
analyzes the maximum number of bits required to encode F (x) for any x (with xi denoting the
ith least significant bit of x). For the worst case analysis, we take b=101010101 . . . 010. We first
tabulate the data, and explanation follows.
fi fi(0) fi(1) (rise)i (fall)i
∑
upto i
(rise)j
∑
upto i
(rise)j
f1 m m+ l l - l -
f2 n− l n - l l l
f3 m m+ 2l 2l - 3l l
f4 n− 2l n - 2l 3l 3l
f5 m m+ 4l 4l - 7l 3l
f6 n− 4l n - 4l 7l 7l
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
fj m m+ 2(j−1)/2l 2(j−1)/2l - (2(j+1)/2 − 1)l (2(j−1)/2 − 1)l
fj+1 n− 2(j−1)/2l n - 2(j−1)/2l (2(j+1)/2 − 1)l (2(j+1)/2 − 1)l
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
fd n− 2(d−1)/2l n - 2(d−1)/2l (2(d+1)/2 − 1)l (2(d+1)/2 − 1)l
For the worst case,
fi(bi) = n, ∀i ∈ Y and,
fi(bi) = m, ∀i ∈ S .
Clearly, the worst case number of bits required to represent F (x) (corresponding to F (1111...1)) is
O(log(d/2(m + n) +
j=⌊d/2⌋∑
j=1
2j l)) = O(log(2⌊d/2⌋+1 + d/2(m+ n))) = O(d/2 + log(d/2)) = O(d).
Also note that, since the function preserves order only with respect to the value b, thus, it is possible
to construct an order preserving function at b, with an output space having cardinality lesser than
that of the input space. For example, the function: F defined as : F (x) = c0 < b ∀x < b, and
F (x) = c1 > b ∀x < b, is also an order preserving function at point b having an output space of
cardinality 2.
3.4.5 Formalizing Protocol C
Protocol C uses 1 out of 2 Oblivious Transfer(OT) protcol as a subroutine. Some details of 1-out-of-2
OT protocol Rabin [15] have been discussed at the end of this subsection .
Assume that Alice owns the private variable a, and Bob owns the private variable b. Let the bound
on the length of the input be d bits.
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1. Bob constructs the above mentioned function F w.r.t. b. For generating the random values
of fis using a single seed S, refer to Section 3.4.6
2. Alice uses 1-out-of-2 OT for each input bit ai to obtain the bit encoding fi(ai) for each i and
then computes F (a) = F (an . . . a1) = fn(an) + fn−1(an−1) + · · ·+ f1(a1).
3. Bob then sends F (b) to Alice, who then compares F (a) and F (b) and tells the result to Bob.
The correctness of the protocol follows from the correctness of the construction of the desired
function F (w.r.t. b).
1-out-2 Oblivious Transfer : For OT (1 out of 2), sender(S) has two secrets, m1 and m2, and would
like the receiver(R) to receive one of them, as per her choice. But, R does not want S to know which
secret it chooses and S wants R to know only the secret of her choice, revealing no information
about the other secret. In our case, Bob has the secrets fi(0) and fi(1), and Alice has a bit ai,
corresponding to which she wants the secret fi(ai). In the process, Alice wants her bit value to
remain a secret and Bob wants Alice to obtain only the mapping corresponding to her bit value,
hiding the mapping of the other bit.
Practically used 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer involves four encryptions and two decryptions in a
commutative encryption scheme, like RSA. Practically, public-key cryptography is expensive and
hence it is preferrable to use a linear (even if large) number of cheap operations (in Oblivious
Transfer).
3.4.6 Randomly Choosing fis using a single seed S
We first consider a PRG G : {0, 1}c −→ {0, 1}2dc, where c is the bit size of the seed S used in the
generation of random number in G, and d is the bound on bit-size of input.
We can then split up the output of G into 2d pieces each of size c and sequentially use the 2d pieces
as seeds in a generator G′ : {0, 1}c −→ {0, 1}O(d) to obtain the random values of fis in the desired
ranges.
The security of this method has been argued in "Foundations of Cryptography-Basic Tools" by
Goldreich [10].
3.4.7 Analysis
Communication Overhead: The protocol uses d parallel rounds of 1-out-of-2 OT, each on O(d)
bit numbers and requiring a different key. O(d) bits are required in step 3 to communicate F (b)
to Alice. A single bit is transferred at the end to convey the result of the protocol (determined by
Alice) to Bob.
Computation Complexity: The protocol requires: n additions (requiring a total of O(n2)) +
2n × (Complexity of generating an n-bit random number). Since pseudorandom numbers can be
generated efficiently, hence, the computations involved can be done efficiently.
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Security: Alice gets to see fi(ai) for all i. However, since for each i either fi(0) or fi(1) is chosen
uniformly at random (according to our construction of F (Section 3.4.1)); and also, Alice doesn’t
know which of fi(0) or fi(1) is chosen at random, and neither does she know the range from which
the parameters m,n, l are chosen (which are also chosen uniformly at random), hence, it is difficult
for her to deduce any information about the Bob’s private variable b.
The security of the protocol also depends on the security of the PRG used and the security of the
1-out-of-2 OT protocol used to transfer fi(xi)s.
4 Conclusion and Future Directions
It has been demonstrated that millionaires problem can be solved using linear communication over-
head with an untrusted non-colluding third party and quadratic communication overhead without
a third party. However, we still need to concretely prove a lower bound on the communication
and computational complexity of solving the millionaire’s problem, later extending it to the com-
putation of general functions. A proof of lower bound would give us an insight in the difficulty
of securely and jointly computing any function in general and hence would aid us in designing
protocols for efficiently computing those functions.
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